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I. Introduction
Human choice is a foundational part of our social, economic and political institutions. Many decisions that in the past were determined by birth,
religion, or social rank are now determined by individuals, whether independently or collectively. Our political and market systems, for example,
are largely based on the aggregation of human choices. This is not to say
that choices are unlimited. The state places limits on some types of actions,
such as how we can express our aggressions or joys, while market forces
and technological limitations determine the menu of options from which we
can choose. Yet human choice is an integral and fundamental part of our
private and public lives.
This focus is about to be significantly challenged, at least in the marketplace. Technological advances in data collection, data science, artificial
intelligence, and communications systems are ushering in a new era in
which digital agents, operated through algorithms, replace human choice
1
with regard to many transactions and actions. While algorithms are given
assignments, they autonomously determine how to carry them out. Indeed,
scientists envision a near future “where humans do less thinking when it
2
comes to the small decisions that make up daily life.”
The day when algorithms will be able to make choices for users and
carry them out is already here. This digital revolution has taken place in
3
some supply markets, such as online trading, and is now fast expanding in
consumption markets. This remarkable transformation is happening thanks
not only to developments in technology, but also to the increasing openness
4
among users to having digital assistants make decisions for them. While the
first generation of consumer-oriented algorithms suggested products, services or actions for users to choose from (e.g., Kayak, Yelp, Amazon, etc.),
those in the second generation make a decisions for the user rather than
merely a suggestion, and automatically proceed to execute the actions or the
transactions based on the decision, on the user’s behalf (“algorithmic assistants”). To give a few examples, Samsung sells a washing machine which
detects when detergent levels are low and automatically orders new deter-

1.
See Yuval Noah Harrari, Yuval Noah Harari on Big Data, Google, and the End of
Free Will, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/50bb4830-6a4c-11e6ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c.
2.
See Danny Yadron, Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple To Be the Ultimate Digital Butler, GUARDIAN, (May 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/may/18/google-home-assistant-amazon-echo-apple-siri.
3.
See, e.g., Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating
the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. R. 221 (2015).
4.
See Pedro Domingos, Get Ready For Your Digital Model, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/get-ready-for-your-digital-model-1447351480.
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5

gent; Self-driving cars, already on the road in some localities, make a full
range of driving decisions, from what route to take and when to fill the gas
6
tank to how to engage with other vehicles and road users; The British application Flipper monitors prices in the energy market and automatically
7
switches suppliers for its users when it is profitable; and a Hong Kong venture fund called Deep Knowledge Ventures appointed an algorithm to its
board, enabling it to vote on investment decisions alongside its five human
8
directors.
Algorithmic assistants have much to offer. They offer speed, lower
transaction costs and efficiency in decision-making, thereby enabling the
9
user to enjoy lower cost and higher quality products. Furthermore, artificial
intelligence coupled with the analysis of big data enables algorithms to
make more sophisticated choices. Accordingly, the algorithm’s choices
might sometimes suit the user’s needs better than his own choices, which
could be biased or based on limited information. Computer scientists predict
that as more data about human actions and choices is accumulated and ana10
lyzed, the algorithm might know us better than ourselves.
We will (hopefully) never reach the Matrix trilogy’s vision of a world
in which a computer makes all the choices for us while we float in a bubble,
11
oblivious to the true nature of our reality. But like the apple in the garden,

5.
Stan Higgins, IBM Reveals Proof of Concept for Blockchain-Powered Internet of
Things, COINDESK (Jan. 17, 2015, 7:12 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ibm-reveals-proofconcept-blockchain-powered-internet-things; SANJAY PANIKER ET AL., ADEPT: AN IOT
PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVE 13 (Draft. Copy for Advance Review, Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/252917347/IBM-ADEPT-Practictioner-Perspective-PrePublication-Draft-7-Jan-2015.
6.
See, e.g., JOHN MCCARTHY ET AL., CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES:
INTRODUCING THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY (2015), https://www.atkinsglobal.com/~/media/
Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/uk-and-europe/uk-thought-leadership/reports/CAV_A4_
080216.pdf.
7.
Flipper Team and Beyond, FLIPPER https://flipper.community/company/about, (last
visited Nov. 8, 2018).
8.
Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an Algorithm to Its Board of Directors — Here’s What It Actually Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2014), http://
www.businessinsider.com/vital-named-to-board-2014-5.
9.
ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 191 (2016); Michal S. Gal & Niva
Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 309, 311 (2017).
10.
See, e.g., James Max Kaanter & Kalyan Veeramachaneni, Deep Feature Synthesis:
Towards Automating Data Science Endeavors, IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA
SCIENCE AND ADVANCED ANALYTICS, (Oct. 2015), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/EVODesignOpt/groupWebSite/uploads/Site/DSAA_DSM_2015.pdf (reporting on an experiment in
which the algorithm better predicted human behavior than humans).
11.
THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Bros. 2003);
THE MATRIX REVOLUTIONS (Warner Bros. 2003). Observe that in the movie human choice is
revered.
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once tasted, algorithmic assistants may be impossible to live without. Pedro Domingo, professor of computer science, predicts that “a decade from
now, your personal model will be more indispensable than your
13
smartphone.” This is because “[a]lgorithms will build data-driven alter
14
egos for us that can do job interviews [and] shop for cars.” Indeed, “[s]oon
enough, facing the fog of life without a good model to guide you will seem
15
unendurable.” Furthermore, in a competitive world, market players who
prefer to exercise their own decision-making power will not necessarily always have a meaningful ability to do so, given the comparative advantages
of those using algorithms. Possible expectations that humans should be aided by algorithmic decision-making—thereby replacing the “reasonable per16
son” with a “reasonable algorithm,” at least in some areas —might further
limit one’s genuine ability to make autonomous choices. Indeed, regulators
17
are already encouraging the use of algorithms in some fields.
This technological change goes to the heart of autonomous human
18
choice. The user, voluntarily and willingly, removes himself from the de19
20
cision-making process. Of course, he chooses which algorithm to employ
12.
Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 83 (2015).
13.
Domingos, supra note 4.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of
Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that once computers become safer
than people, they should become the new standard for care).
17.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, Informing Consumers through Smart Disclosure 2 (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informingconsumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf (directing all administrative agencies to pursue
“smart disclosures” that provide consumers with access to the information they need to make
informed decisions in machine readable data formats, in order to fuel the creation of interactive tools for consumers).
18.
Of course, the use of algorithms raises other concerns as well, such as the displacement of human workers and a more limited ability of those contracting with the algorithm to raise arguments designed to “change its mind,” given that it requires going back to
the algorithm’s designer. These issues are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on
human autonomous choice. We acknowledge that autonomy eludes a clear definition, and is a
matter of degree. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 32-35 (2001). In this article we allude to it as concerning the degree to which a person can be the author of his life, all constraints considered.
Finally, a sub-set of the issues raised in this article can be applied to corporations that use algorithmic assistants as well.
19.
In this article we mainly focus on the effects on the user of the algorithm, rather
than on third parties involuntarily affected or subjected to algorithmic decisions. For issues
that relate to third parties, see, e.g., Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L. J. 1245
(2016) (arguing that the use of machines and automated processes in the criminal justice system is problematic, inter alia, since they compromise dignity, equity, and mercy); Tal Zarsky,
The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41(1) SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES
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and may set at least part of the decision parameters. But other choices then
follow automatically, in which the algorithm exercises its own judgment.
Furthermore, due to developments in deep learning, a process by which the
algorithm’s decision parameters are continuously updated and refined based
21
on data analysis, the user might have no information about which parameters underlie the algorithm’s choice, or how much weight is given to each
parameter. Alternatively, the user might not have the capacity or the permission to exercise effective control over the algorithm’s choices. One might
say that this is a significant technological nail in the coffin of human choice,
which follows the previous narrowing of choice through phenomena such as
22
choice architecture and echo chambers.
It is therefore time to explore whether and, if so, under which conditions, are we willing to give up our autonomous choice, and how autonomous algorithmic assistants affect existing laws which were designed to apply to human choice. Answering the first question requires us to explore the
rationales that stand at the basis of autonomous human choice, and how they
are affected by algorithmic assistants; to conscientiously contend with the
“choice paradox” which arises from the fact that the decision to turn over
one’s choices to an algorithm is, itself, an act of choice. It also requires us to
think seriously about the way in which the choices we make affect our values, identities, and the meaning and content of our lives.
We then explore how autonomous algorithmic assistants affect the legal
framework. Some issues challenge the very use of algorithmic assistants:
Should the law place an age limit on the use of such algorithms? Should legal limits be placed on their use in certain spheres? Other issues arise from

118, 118-19 (2016) (focusing on fairness concerns, from unfair wealth distribution, unfair different treatment, etc.); M Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41(1)
SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 3, 5-6 (2016) (concerns include “bias, discrimination, fairness,
distribution of visibility, surveillance, and accountability”). Some of these issues can be
solved, at least partially, by computational neutrality. Another issue relates to human decisionmaking. Article 22 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation provides that individuals
generally have the right not to be subjected to decisions that are based solely on automated
processing, when these are deemed to have a significant effect. Regulation 2016/679, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 Apr. 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
20.
Observe that should the employment of an algorithm not be voluntary, a different
host of issues arises, which is beyond the scope of this article.
21.
See, e.g., OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION FOR GROWTH AND WELL-BEING:
INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT 4 (Oct. 2014). For examples of machine learning already used in
algorithms, see EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9.
22.
For some of the most notable work on choice architecture, see generally Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159, 1160 (2003); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93
AM. ECON. REV. 175, 179 (2003).
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23

the construction of preferences by algorithms. To wit, in a market in which
demand is driven by algorithms, can we necessarily regard the choices made
as expressions of user preferences that serve our socio-political goals? Even
if the answer is positive—does this new mode of user choice fit current legal assumptions, such as those that apply to the notions of consent or intent?
And are our regulatory tools, which seek to ensure that individual consumers can make informed decisions, outmoded? It is therefore essential to determine whether the existing legal framework is sufficiently potent to deal
with this brave new world, or whether we need new regulatory tools.
Despite their importance and timeliness, these questions have not been
dealt with in depth. This article seeks to fill this void. It proceeds as follows.
Part II explores the lure and modes of operation of algorithmic assistants,
and how these characteristics may affect human choice. Part III then analyzes the rationales for such choice, and explores how these rationales are affected by the employment of autonomous algorithmic assistants. As shown,
while some rationales are not harmed—and might even be strengthened—
by the use of autonomous algorithmic assistants, others challenge us to reconsider the meaning and the role that choice plays in our lives and to deal
with the conflict between the efficient fulfillment of short-term preferences
and the long-term ability to form such preferences. Part IV analyzes the implications of these new private orderings on regulation, with a special focus
on laws based on assumptions of human autonomous decision-making. We
summarize our findings in a short conclusion.

II. Choice in the Digital World
How do algorithmic assistants affect individual choice? This part of the
article offers a short note on the technological capabilities, as well as the potential downsides, of algorithmic assistants. It then identifies and analyzes
four non-exclusive categories of algorithmic assistants, with growing effects
on choice. Such an analysis is necessary in order to provide a solid basis for
understanding how algorithms affect human choice.

A. Technological Abilities of Algorithmic Assistants 24
Computerized algorithms are structured decision-making processes that
automate computational procedures to generate decisional outcomes on the
25
basis of data inputs. The decisional parameters and rules for weighting

23.
We define preferences widely to include also those based on moral, ethical or intellectual values, such as fairness, generosity, or environmental protection. Preferences can include both short-term desires as well as long-term goals.
24.
Largely based on Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9.
25.
See, e.g., THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed.
2009).
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them can be set by the algorithm’s designer. Advanced algorithms employ
machine learning, in which the algorithm self-adjusts based on its own analyses of data previously encountered, freeing the algorithm from predefined
preferences. For instance, based on a consumer’s past actions, an algorithm
may conclude that the consumer likes to purchase products similar to those
bought by his close friends, and change the decisional parameters accordingly.
A wide variety of algorithms already help users make choices. At the
most basic level, algorithms offer information about possible options (e.g.,
26
Travelocity or Yelp). Others narrow down the options, presenting only
those assumed to be most relevant (e.g., Tinder, Amazon). The new generation of algorithmic assistants takes such services a step further, making and
executing decisions for the user by directly communicating with other systems through the internet. The algorithm automatically identifies a need,
searches for an optimal purchase, and executes the transaction. Such algorithmic assistants can be employed by both consumers and suppliers, making or accepting offers. They can also make decisions that do not involve
the marketplace, such as how to organize one’s day, who to date, whether to
take an umbrella, what route to follow to a given destination that would reduce CO2 emissions, and how to drive one’s car.
The rise of algorithmic assistants is facilitated and accelerated by the
advantages they offer over human choice, which are at a level never reached
27
before. As elaborated below, they enable speedier, more efficient and more
28
sophisticated decisions. Furthermore, the algorithm’s capacity to perform
its task is limited only by technology and data; it is never tired, stressed, or
29
sick. Algorithms can also avoid users’ biases and overcome manipulative
30
marketing techniques. Given these comparative advantages, large digital
31
companies are already competing to become users’ digital assistants. Ex-

26.
Interestingly, some administrative agencies have also created online comparison
tools, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage calculator. See, e.g.,
Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1280-85 (2017).
27.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC
SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2016).
28.
In some markets, such as online financial trading, speed creates an important advantage. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of
High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2110 (2015).
29.
This is not to deny the potential risk of infection with software viruses or malware.
30.
For sub-optimal decisions, see, for example, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos
Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REV. 281 (1972). For a
discussion of how consumers are affected by visual stimuli, see, for example, Milica Milosavljevic et al., Relative Visual Saliency Differences Induce Sizable Bias in Consumer
Choice, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 67 (2012).
31.
Yadron, supra note 2.
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amples include Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, and Amazon’s Alexa. The
huge investments involved are based on the assumption that the use of algorithmic assistants will become commonplace and will serve as a main gateway to the internet. This does not imply that unassisted human decisionmaking will completely disappear. Nonetheless, even users who enjoy decision-making may prefer to employ algorithmic assistants for the purchase of
certain products or services, or for other types of decisions.
At the same time, algorithmic assistants may also generate new harms
and risks. A major potential harm, elaborated below, involves choices that
33
do not accurately reflect consumers’ preferences. Another potential harm
is users’ increased vulnerability to the risks associated with the digital
world, such as risks to privacy and cyber-security. Also, technology can reduce our awareness of our actions. Navigation applications which make users less conscious of their location exemplify this phenomenon. Finally, algorithmic assistants have potentially profound implications for human
choice, given that the user is at least one step removed from the algorithm’s
decisions. This latter effect is the focus of this article.

B. A Taxonomy of Algorithmic Assistants
The effects of algorithmic assistants on users’ choice depend on their
design and technological capabilities. Two main dimensions affect the user’s choice: the decision parameters employed by the algorithm, and the
level of choice which remains at the hands of the user.
We identify four paradigmatic categories of decision parameters used
by algorithmic assistants, with growing effects on users’ autonomous
34
choice. In the first category the user sets the exact decisional parameters to
be used by the algorithm as well as the weight to be given to each one (e.g.,
cost over quality, reliability over speed of delivery). The algorithm then
chooses among the options it detects in accordance with these preferences.
We call algorithms in this group “Stated Preferences Algorithms.” In this
scenario, the algorithm simply serves as the automated and efficient long

32.
These algorithms are designed to perform multiple actions and transactions, beyond
purchase decisions. An interesting recent example involves Google’s Jarvis, which seeks to
create a smart home based on the Internet of Things. See Jessica Guynn, Morgan Freeman to
Voice Mark Zuckerberg’s Jarvis, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:31 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/20/morgan-freeman-voice-markzuckerbergs-jarvis/95656216/.
33.
See infra Section III.B.
34.
For a discussion of the various levels of automation that reflect distinct degrees of
human–machine interaction, see, for example, Argyro Karanasiou & Dimitris A. Pinotsis, A
Study into the Layers of Automated Decision Making: Emergent Normative and Legal Aspects
of Deep Learning, 31 INT’L REV. OF L., COMPUTERS & TECH. 170 (2017).
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35

arm of the user. The user and algorithm’s choices completely overlap, but
the algorithm enables a more efficient execution of the decision.
In the second category the user chooses the decisional parameters from
a fixed menu prepared by the algorithm’s designer (“Menu of Preferences
36
Algorithm”). Such menus—in essence not very different from menus in
restaurants—generally limit the range of options that can be reached
through the algorithm, even if products that fit the user’s real preferences
37
are available. Sites like Travelocity and Airbnb exemplify such menus in
which the user is limited to a predefined set of parameters from which he
can choose. While potentially limiting choice, these menus might make the
decision easier for the user. They can also create economies of scale in the
analysis and the execution of the transaction by the algorithm, should it be
employed in parallel by different users, for example if the algorithms can
then order large quantities of the same product.
The third category is more complex yet more intriguing. In this category the algorithm applies decisional parameters which are not (wholly) based
on the consumer’s stated or chosen preferences. Rather, the algorithm generates a simulation which attempts to mimic and predict consumer preferences. We call this group “Predicted Preferences Algorithms.”
The prediction of preferences has become one of the most important
turfs of competition in the digital world, in which data on users’ past choices and traits is the main currency. While demand predictions were always an
integral part of the market economy (e.g., producers chose in which newspaper to advertise in accordance with the predicted preferences of readers),
recent advancements in data collection and data science have made such
predictions much easier and more sophisticated. To construct such predictions, data are collected from numerous sources, including the internet, as
well as the Internet-of-Things via trillions of sensors placed in machines
38
connected to the internet around the world. The ability to collect data is
35.
This proposition is based on the assumption that the user would have invested the
necessary resources to make the most efficient decision.
36.
The difference between the Stated Preferences Algorithm and the Menu of Preferences Algorithm is largely based on who determines the decisional parameters that limit the
algorithm’s choices in the first place. In the first category, the user sets the parameters, and
can thus set them in complete accordance with his preferences, dependent, of course, on the
algorithm’s technological capabilities. In the second category, the designer sets the parameters, and thus they might not exactly fit those of the user (for example, I also want to give
weight to the movies shown on the flight, but this is not a parameter I can choose from if it
was not included by the algorithms’ designer).
37.
Attempts to create a more customized menu of choices can be exemplified by
Google Now’s new feature, “Explore Interests,” which requests users actively input areas of
interest. See, e.g., Phil Oakley, Google adds Explore Interests to Now with six categories to
get updates on, ANDROID POLICE (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.androidpolice.com/2016/08/08/
google-adds-explore-interests-now-six-categories-get-updates/.
38.
See, generally, OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL,
GROWTH AND INNOVATION (2013).
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strengthened by what Professor Noah Harrari has called the “Data Reli39
gion” which worships measuring numerous aspects of our lives (such as
the number of steps we take each day) as well as the sharing and transparen40
cy of data (such as via online social networks), and by the willingness of
41
many users to share data for a small benefit. Sensors which detect users’
physiological reactions to events in real time also provide invaluable data to
learn about users’ preferences. Such sensors already exist (such as Fitbit),
and more sophisticated ones are being created. This exponentially fastgrowing honeycomb of data is collected, organized and stored in humongous databases. Rapidly advancing techniques of data science such as pattern
recognition and machine learning, are combined with traditional tools such
42
as statistics to mine valuable information from the data. This data analysis
serves as the basis for the creation of user profiles, which generally act like
a “digital shadow,” attempting to mimic users’ preferences. The profile is
based on past revealed preferences (such as that the user has read detective
novels) which can be combined with the choices of others with relatively
similar profiles. This, in turn, enables the predicted preferences algorithm
not only to identify, but also to predict, a user’s future preferences. The algorithm might even identify preferences that users themselves are unaware
of (e.g., the user believes she prefers healthy food; the algorithm detects that
she periodically submits to a craving for chocolate). Indeed, data scientists
43
argue that algorithms can teach us things we don’t know about ourselves.
A wide variety of algorithms already use predicted preferences to guide
users through decision-making processes, such as Amazon’s product suggestions. As Professor Richard Ford puts it, “If I purchase a CD by Britney
Spears. . . it will recommend Christina Aguilera and other prepubescent
bleached blondes singing upbeat pop. . . If it’s good enough, I’m likely to
rely more and more heavily on the selections of the cyber doppelganger and

39.
See Daniel Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 339 (2017).
40.
See, generally, YUVAL NOAH HARRARI, HOMO DEUS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
TOMORROW (2016). This trend is further strengthened by the externalities created when only
some people reveal their information: others may find that they must also disclose private information to avoid the negative inferences attached to staying silent. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD,
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 90 (1994); Scott
R Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure
Future 105 NW. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
41.
See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 249 (2013).
42.
See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 3 (2014).
43.
See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, When Tech Knows You Better than You Know Yourself, WIRED (April 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-yuval-noahharari-tristan-harris/.
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less on my own judgment and the limited information I can gather my44
self.”
The fourth category of algorithmic assistants, which we call “Paternalistic Algorithms,” is a sub-category of the third one and has the largest effect on choice, making choices for the user which are assumed to be best for
him overall, even if they clash with his immediate preferences. Such algorithms may purposefully give more weight to long-term preferences over
short-term ones, and to rational preferences over immediate and emotionally-driven ones. For example, although I’m in the mood to eat pizza tonight,
45
the algorithm will order salad, which better fits my current health needs.
Accordingly, the user employs the algorithm to impose self-restraint upon
his own choices.
Observe that a choice between algorithms which fall into the different
categories, in itself, might serve as an indication of the user’s preferences. A
decision to use a Paternalistic Preferences algorithm signals that the user
prefers long-term considerations to short-term ones, as long as the user is
informed of the differences between the different algorithms and they are
otherwise quite similar (e.g., in their computational powers).
The second dimension which affects users’ choice is the level of control
over the decision which remains in the user’s hands once the algorithm is
employed (human-in-the-loop), regardless of which of the four categories
characterizes the algorithm. At one extreme, all potential options are presented to the user (e.g., Google Search). Even in this case the choice architecture, such as which options are presented first, may still affect the user’s
46
choice. Some algorithms narrow down the options for the user, based on
his digital profile, presenting only those options assumed to be most relevant. Karen Yeung argues that such algorithms create a “hypernudge ef47
fect,” prodding the user to reach a specific decision. Other algorithms
make a choice, which is then subject to the user’s approval. In all the above
cases, while the algorithm may indirectly influence the choice, the ultimate
decision is made by the user.
At the other end of the spectrum the algorithm automatically identifies a
need, searches for an optimal purchase, negotiates and executes the transaction. The user provides second-order consent, waiving his right to choose

44.
Richard T. Ford, Save the Robots: Cyber Profiling and Your So-Called Life, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000).
45.
See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person, 68 J.
OF PHIL. 5 (1971) which offers a two-level model: first-order and second-order desires.
46.
See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23
MARK. LETT. 487 (2012).
47.
See Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20
INFO., COMM. & SOC. 118, 118 (2017).
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directly or even to approve the choice made on his behalf. For example,
consider the following scenario. Sensors are placed in the user’s garden and
in the fertilizers’ storage area. Data collected from both sources are analyzed by a specialized algorithm to determine when fertilizer supply is low,
as well as the actual fertilizing needs of the particular garden. Decisional
parameters may also include real-time data predicting seasonal weather,
temporary shortage of certain products, and price changes. Once a choice
has been made, based on the data analysis, the algorithm automatically
49
places an order and arranges for payment and delivery, which it can do
with the assistance of on-line software agents (“shopping bots”).50 It can
even employ a robot to distribute the fertilizer in the garden. The selfexecuting quality of these autonomous algorithmic assistants limits the need
for human intervention beyond the employment of the algorithm and the initial placement of the sensors.
Below we focus on algorithmic assistants which are either predicted
preferences algorithms or paternalistic preferences algorithms. Given the
way that technology is currently developing and their relative advantages,
such algorithms are likely to be widely used, at least with regard to some
decisions. We assume that algorithmic assistants are designed, supplied and
controlled by external firms. When the algorithm is written or controlled by
the user, some—though not all—of the effects on user choice analyzed below are mitigated.

C. The Effects of Algorithms on Choice
Autonomous algorithmic assistants affect the act of choice: the user
chooses to employ the algorithm, and the algorithm then makes autonomous
choices for the user. The choice of an algorithm might be made by an algorithm which compares algorithms that make final decisions, which, in turn,
might be chosen by an algorithm which compares among comparison algorithms. Furthermore, an algorithm might set our preferences for the use by
another algorithm. The user can thus be further removed from his final
choice.
More importantly, algorithmic assistants may also affect the content of
the decision made on behalf of the user. This may happen for several rea-

48.
See, generally, Dave Wendler, Deception in Medical and Behavioral Research: Is
It Ever Acceptable?, 74 MILBANK Q. 87 (1996).
49.
Jane L. Levere, When a Robot Books Your Airline Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2016, at B6.
50.
“Agents could behave autonomously or proactively. The intelligence of an agent
refers to its ability of performing tasks or actions using relevant information gathered as part
of different problem-solving techniques such as influencing, reasoning, and application specific knowledge.” Prashant R. Nair, E-Supply Chain Management Using Software Agents,
COMPUTER SOC’Y OF INDIA COMM. 14 (July 2013).
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sons. First, the ability of algorithms to analyze substantially more information in a quick, relatively costless and sophisticated way, increases the
number of possibilities that can be analyzed in a given time or cost frame,
thereby increasing the number of options.
Second, when the weight to be given to different decisional parameters
cannot be exactly specified by the user, and the algorithm’s choice is based
on machine learning analysis of the user’s past choices, some level of unpredictability is almost always built into the system. This is partly because
humans often are not aware of the exact weight they give to each decisional
parameter they use and often cannot quantify their preferences. For instance,
how might one quantify the potential increase in positive feelings and creativity that would accrue from writing with the exact same pen used by Albert Einstein? This, in turn, implies that an algorithm’s choice cannot always be predicted by the user.
Third, algorithms can reduce consumer biases that negatively affect his
52
welfare. Even in the case of stated preferences algorithms, the user might
not include decisional parameters that might have otherwise affected his decision (e.g., the color or font size used on the product’s packaging). In both
the predicted preferences algorithms and paternalistic algorithms, biases are
likely to be given little weight, if any, in the decision parameters used, unless the algorithm’s designer considers them part of the user’s preferences
53
and he is able to recognize such biases in the first place. In all cases, the
user need not be aware of such biases.

51.
Arguments that algorithms affect choice are not new. In the past such arguments
centered on the fact that algorithms affected choice by showing each user the exact same results. The advent of user profiling has changed the content of the choices as well as the arguments raised.
52.
For consumer biases see, for example, Benjamin E. Hilbig, On the Role of Recognition In Consumer Choice: A Model Comparison, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 51
(2014) (biases based on name recognition); Ming Hsu & Carolyn Yoon, The Neuroscience of
Consumer Choice, 5 CURRENT OP. IN BEHAV. SCIS. 116, 118 (Oct. 2015) (biases based on
product placement). For a survey of the literature on biases regarding the Free Effect—by
which consumers value a free product more than its actual worth, see Michal S. Gal & Daniel
Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80
ANTITRUST L. J. 521, 528 (2016). Observe, however, that not all biases are necessarily welfare-reducing.
53.
If we look far enough into the future, this problem might also have a technological
solution. For example, the grey box may appear to us to be colorful if we look at it through
our virtual reality glasses. Alternatively, our personal robot will open the package in our absence. For the ability of algorithms to limit biases, partly based on the analysis of data which
indicates inefficient correlations in our decision-making, see, for example, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OF EXCLUSION? (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusionunderstanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf.
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Fourth, algorithms limit the cognitive overload that might have prevent54
ed the user from making an efficient choice. Once the user is occupied by
one decision, he might have less capacity to make another decision in an efficient manner. Furthermore, an abundance of choice might lead people to
55
make bad choices or to not choose at all. An algorithm does not suffer
from such limitations, up to the extent of his technological capacities.
Fifth, algorithms may change the user’s choice by overcoming manipulative marketing techniques which play on people’s vulnerabilities to affect
56
their thinking, emotions, and behavior. For instance, an algorithmic assistant will not end up buying the chocolate stacked near the cashier just because it cannot fight temptation while waiting in line. In our digital world,
this may create an important advantage since, as Ryan Calo argues, advancements in big data significantly increase the potential for digital market
57
manipulations.
Sixth, the use of algorithmic assistants could create incentives for suppliers to create a greater diversity of products in order to serve customers’
exact preferences, thereby increasing consumer choice. Finally, paternalistic
algorithms may at least partially remedy a widespread criticism of human
choices: that individuals adopt preferences not because they serve their interests, but because these preferences were shaped by social and economic
58
conditions. Acknowledging such preferences, the designer of the algorithm
might instead give more weight to considerations which actually serve the
user’s interests. Indeed, algorithmic assistants provide a market-based technological solution to some of the major problems that currently plague human choice.
At the same time, algorithmic decisions might be based on incorrect assumptions embedded in the code by the designer (such as the user always
reads the same type of books) or arising from the algorithm’s data analysis
59
(such as incorrect consumer profiling). Indeed, if we assume that choice is
based on multiple variables that resist a straightforward or even determina-

54.
See Evan Selinger & Thomas P. Seager, Digital Jiminy Crickets, SLATE (July 13,
2012, 6:33 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2012/07/ethical-decision-making-apps-damageour-ability-to-make-moral-choices.html.
55.
See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS
(2004).
56.
See Robert Epstein, The New Mind Control, AEON (Feb. 18, 2016), https://aeon.co/
essays/how-the-internet-flips-elections-and-alters-our-thoughts (providing examples of manipulative marketing techniques and describing the way search engines affect users’ perceptions).
57.
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulations, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1006-18
(2014).
58.
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
59.
See, e.g., Solon Barocas et al., Governing Algorithms: A Provocation Piece, (Mar.
29, 2013), http://edshare.soton.ac.uk/8849/31/48-Governing-Algorithms.pdf; Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980).
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ble reduction to a predetermined decision tree, then algorithms cannot always correctly predict human choice. Rather, humans often possess heterogeneous preferences which may come into conflict. Some choices might
even be deliberately suboptimal from an efficiency point of view, but still
61
increase the user’s utility. Furthermore, even if the algorithm recognizes
and attempts to follow a user’s behavioral pattern, what happens when that
pattern includes a completely different choice made occasionally? How will
the algorithm establish when precisely to introduce the new, spontaneous
element and change the user’s previously determined preference?
Moreover, choices made by the algorithm might be more self62
perpetuating and path-dependent than human choices would otherwise be.
This is because past choices serve as signals for future ones, and also because if the user is not exposed to other options, then his predicted choices
will most likely not change in the future. Furthermore, once the algorithm is
employed by many users, mistaken assumptions embedded in the code can
be multiplied. This could lead to limited demand for some welfareenhancing products resulting from such mistakes.
So far we have disregarded third-party interests, assuming that algorithms simply seek to further the user’s welfare. As Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke elaborate, in reality, algorithmic choices might also be affected
63
by the interests of third parties. Providers of algorithms, as well as firms
which enjoy significant power in a market controlling a resource which is
necessary for the operation of the algorithm, might have incentives to
change users’ choices in order to fit their own underlying interests or be64
liefs, thus generating systematically skewed decisions. A provocative example involves Facebook’s alleged attempt to push upwards more liberal
65
news without user’s knowledge. Competition among algorithms may reduce this effect, as can information about an algorithm’s decision parame66
ters.

60.
See, e.g., Manuel Vargas, If Free Will Doesn’t Exist, Neither Does Water, in
EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 177 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013).
61.
Morris Altman, Freedom to Choose and Choice X-Inefficiencies: Human and Consumer Rights, and Positive and Normative Implications of Choice Behavior, 68 REV. SOC.
ECON. 395, 399-400 (2010).
62.
See, e.g., BAROCAS ET AL., supra note 59, ¶ 33.
63.
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9.
64.
These concerns resonate with critiques which highlight how powerful internet intermediaries, such as Google, act as critical gatekeepers. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond
Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 121 (2010) (exploring the regulation of search engines); Yeung, supra note 47, at 123-24.
65.
See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 198.
66.
See id. at 202; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 20-21.
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This raises the following question: why would users choose an algorithm that does not always make optimal decisions for them? Several factors
come into play. For one, the user might be unaware of the algorithm’s effects on choice due, inter alia, to the limited transparency of the algorithm
and its “black box” quality. A user who is unaware of the algorithm’s limitations, would likely not be aware of choices he has forgone. Such a market
failure would be very difficult to fix, as users cannot be expected to exercise
oversight when dealing with unknown unknowns. Alternatively, users may
find it increasingly difficult—or not worth their while—to exercise over67
sight over sophisticated and opaque systems. Indeed, as algorithms become more complicated and sophisticated, even their designers might not
68
completely understand the algorithm’s decisional parameters. These limi69
tations can be partly reduced if transparency of the algorithm is required or
if a secondary market is created for tools for explaining the decisions of and
comparing algorithms. Thirdly, the overall choices made by the algorithm
may still be better than other options, including making decisions without an
algorithm. This is especially true for those instances in which an algorithm
serves multiple tasks which cannot be separated, most of which it performs
70
well. Finally, as Maurice Stucke and Alan Grunes note, the tyranny of the
majority can dictate the choices of the minority: if you want to join an application and benefit from its network effects, you must accept the terms it
71
offers. In some cases, however, deference to human choices (e.g., the user
may direct the algorithm to choose a historic novel today) may limit such
vulnerabilities.
In short, not only the act of choice is affected by the use of autonomous
choice algorithms, but also the content of the choice. The digitized artificial
67.
See, e.g., Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms (May 22, 2014), http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/
pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf; Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 182-83.
68.
See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, We’re Building a Dystopia Just to Make People Click on
Ads, TED (Sept. 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_we_re_building_a_
dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads/transcript#t-9834 (“We no longer really understand how these complex algorithms work. We don’t understand how they’re doing this categorization. It’s giant matrices, thousands of rows and columns, maybe millions of rows and
columns, and not the programmers and not anybody who looks at it, even if you have all the
data, understands anymore how exactly it’s operating”). For the effects of computational
complexity on the transparency of the algorithm see also Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note
34, at 182.
69.
For such suggestion see, for example, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); D.
K. Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process For Automated Predictions,
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 24-25 (2015); Zarsky, supra note 19, at 121. Transparency is a
limited tool, however, with regard to algorithms based on deep learning. See Karanasiou &
Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 183.
70.
See, e.g., Yadron, supra note 2.
71.
MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
168 (2016) (writing on privacy conditions).
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hand supplements the invisible natural hand of the market. Table 1 summarizes the different effects on human choice created by the four types of algorithms.

Table 1: The effects of Algorithms on User’s Choices
Algorithm/User’s
Actions
User choosing to
employ a certain
algorithm
User defining the
decision
parameters
Algorithm
Limiting
behavioral biases
Algorithm’s
Nudge qualities
Algorithm
Increasing the
number and
quality of
choices
Algorithm’s
overall effects on
the user’s choice

Stated
Preferences
+

Menu of
Preferences
+

Predicted
Preferences
+

Paternalistic
Preferences
+

+

+ (partially)

-

-

+
(indirectly)

+ (indirectly,
>)

+ (directly,
>>)

+ (directly,
>>>)

-

+>

+ >>

+ >>

+

+

+

+

+

+>

+ >>

+ >>>

III: The Role of Autonomous Choice
As we have established, algorithms can significantly affect users’
choices. We turn now to the rationales on which human choice is based. We
then explore whether these rationales hold true for choices made by autonomous algorithmic assistants which are voluntarily employed by users. Our
analysis also seeks to explore which challenges to autonomous choice are
inherent to the use of algorithmic assistants, and which can be solved by
technological means.

A. Rationales for Promoting Autonomous Choice
Ideally, autonomous human choice is assumed to be made by a mentally
competent, fully informed individual, through a process of rational self-
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deliberation. The centrality of such self-determination is based on rationales that come from diverse fields, including economics, psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, the cognitive sciences, and political philosophy. Below we explore in broad strokes three main rationales for autonomous
human choice, namely efficiency, psychological effects, and liberal political
73
theory. Some of these are consequentialist, focusing on the direct results of
autonomy, and some are deontological, giving value to autonomy regardless
of its consequences. These theories sometimes complement each other. For
instance, the theory of utilitarianism is sufficiently wide to include psychological rationales for human choice that do not necessarily lead to the most
objectively efficient choices.
We do not to argue that autonomous choice is more important than other values. Yet given its centrality in our society and our legal system, technologies that significantly affect autonomy should be analyzed, so that those
74
who value autonomy can evaluate it in light of its effects. Accordingly, we
seek to analyze the direct effects of algorithmic assistants on our choices, as
well as on our preference formation abilities which, in turn, affect our
choices in the long-run, that is, when sub-optimal choice according to a certain criteria nonetheless increases people’s well-being.

1. Efficiency Rationales
One of the most important assumptions underlying the promotion of
human choice is that individuals know better than anyone else what is best
75
for them. Therefore, the decisions they make are likely to be best from
76
their point of view. This rationale focuses on the result of the act of
choice, rather than on the act itself. It is important to emphasize that the efficiency rationale is based on the assumption that human decisions maximize an individual’s subjective preferences, rather than what an outsider
might think he should prefer.

72.
ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131
(1969). In this article we assume that free choice exists, at least to some extent. Observe that if
we assume that no free will exists, and that all choices are predetermined, then the analysis
below is redundant. We also define autonomy to include acts reflecting consent to external
inputs or inducements.
73.
Given that the use of algorithmic assistants is generally voluntary, we do not relate
to those justifications for autonomy that arise when choice is involuntarily limited, such as
respect for one’s demand to make his own choices which is part of one’s dignity. See, e.g.,
Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will, 116 ETHICS 263 (2006).
74.
See Benkler, supra note 18, at 41.
75.
See Gordon R. Foxal, The Behavior Analysis of Consumer Choice, 24 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 581, 582 (2003). The Kantian tradition also holds this view. See, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 892-93 (1994) (showing that the
Kantian tradition treats autonomy as a super-value, in the sense that, “because rational, autonomous agents” find these values worth pursuing, all values are worth pursuing).
76.
Foxal, supra note 75, at 582.
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The efficiency rationale is fraught with inherent limitations, such as the
fact that individuals do not always make the best choices for themselves,
whether because they are subject to biases and fallacies or because they give
77
too much weight to short-term considerations. In addition, individuals may
not possess all the relevant information necessary to make the best choice
78
for themselves, especially in the digital world, or they may not be able to
overcome collective action problems.

2. Psychological Rationales
Psychological rationales for autonomous choice generally focus on the
psychological values inherent in the act of choice itself, regardless of the
efficiency of the result. One argument centers on the connection between
choice and identity. Conscious and subconscious conceptions of identity are
shaped through choice, offering us opportunities to define and enhance our
self-image, and to create personal meaning and responsibility. The act of
choice also enables us to critically explore, reflect upon, and reform our
preferences. The result of the act of choice can also affect one’s identity.
The effect can be direct; to illustrate, the choice of a book or newspaper can
79
affect a person’s views and values. It can also be indirect, affecting one’s
self-image and personality through the reactions of others to his choices.
Such social reactions, including (in)attention to and (non)appreciation of
80
one’s choices, can also affect one’s well-being.

77.
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-42 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000).
78.
For some information limitations of consumers see, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar,
The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 7 (2009);
Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach
to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 30 (2012); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 840–41 (2006); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity
and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231–32 (2006).
79.
See, e.g., Patti M. Valkenburg, Jochen Peter, and Joseph B. Walther, Media Effects:
Theory and Research, 67 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 315 (2016). A similar line of
arguments was made by C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media
Products, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1389 (2000) (arguing that the media market not only expresses preferences, but shapes them). For an argument that algorithms shape culture see, for
example, TARLETON GILLESPIE, #trendingistrending: When Algorithms Become Culture, in
Algorithmic Cultures: Essays Of Meaning, Performance and New Technologies, in
ALGORITHMIC CULTURES: ESSAYS ON MEANING, PERFORMANCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
(Robert Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge, eds., 2016).
80.
See, e.g., Asle Fagerstrøm et al., Implications of Motivating Operations for the
Functional Analysis of Consumer Choice, 30 J. ORG. BEHAV. MGMT. 110, 113-14 (2010).
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Choice may also strengthen one’s knowledge and recognition of the
81
world and the objects in it which, in turn, affect our conceptions. Furthermore, exercising choice, at least in some spheres, may itself be a source of
pleasure. Indeed, some researchers argue that consumer choice has become
an opiate for contemporary society, since consumption and consumerism
offer immediate gratification, compensating for discontents arising from the
82
lack of control over many aspects of life. The act of choice may also create
a deeper level of engagement in one’s life and choices, thereby strengthen83
ing motivation, responsibility, productivity and healthy functioning.
At the same time, choice can also create psychological burdens which
result from the act of choice itself as well as from internal dilemmas of
84
whether we made the right choice, and from a cognitive overload arising
from too many options or too much information.
The psychological effects explored are not equally strong for all the
choices one makes. Some choices create much weaker psychological effects
than others (such as which fertilizer to buy), and differences exist between
the way individuals psychologically react to choice.

3. Liberty Rationales
Autonomous choice is an important part of the liberal political tradition’s concept of human beings as free, equal and rational, in control of their
85
own life. Under this rationale, the act of choosing, in itself—not just having the ability to choose, or enjoying the objects of our choices—is intrinsically valuable. As John Stuart Mill famously argued, a person’s “. . .own
mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in it86
self, but because it is his own mode.” Accordingly, acting as an autono-

81.
This argument is partly based on the theories of phenomenology (how experience
shapes our consciousness) and empiricism (a branch of epistemology which assumes that
most of our knowledge is experience or experiment-based rather than predetermined).
82.
Yiannis Gabriel, Identity, Choice and Consumer Freedom – the New Opiates? A
Psychoanalytic Interrogation, 15 MARKETING THEORY 25, 28-29 (2015).
83.
See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?, 74 J.
PERSONALITY 1558 (2006).
84.
See Elizabeth Nixon & Yiannis Gabriel, ‘So Much Choice and No Choice At All’: A
Socio-Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Consumerism as a Source of Pollution, 16
MARKETING THEORY 40, 47-49 (2016) (illuminating the discomfort and anxiety which follows many consumers in the shopping process).
85.
See John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social Change, in HUMAN
RIGHTS 36 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tah eds. 1978).
86.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53-71 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co., 1978) (1859). See also BERLIN, supra note 72 (“[T]he word ‘liberty’ derives from the
wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend
on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not
of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by
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mous decision-maker is not only good in its own right; it is also part of what
makes the objects of our choices valuable to us and our way of making life
our own. A life containing goods and pleasures which one has not in fact
87
chosen would therefore appear alienated and incomplete. But even if the
choices we make do not achieve all these benefits, the ability to make our
own choices is valuable in itself.
Some clarification may be in order, as the concept of autonomy used
here should be distinguished from other, related moral values. Speaking
about autonomy, people sometimes confuse two uses of this concept. The
first is autonomy as a sort of capacity. Under this understanding, one is autonomous to the extent that one has the capacity to decide for oneself, or the
ability to be the author of one’s own life. The second is autonomy as an
achievement: actually deciding for oneself, the actual authoring of one’s
88
own life. In this sense, to be autonomous is to act autonomously. The former sense parallels the conceptually neighboring idea of freedom. Freedom
is a capacity rather than its exercise. It consists in either the ability to act
without external restraints or interference (negative freedom), or the ability
89
to act on one’s authentic or rational will (positive freedom). Either way, a
person may be entirely free to choose a course of action without ever exercising that freedom of choice.
Under the latter conception of autonomy, protecting and promoting personal autonomy requires more than the securing of freedoms. Freedom is of
course a necessary condition. A person cannot choose without having free
and acceptable choices. But autonomy can be compromised even if freedom
is not: a life lived passively, without active choices being made, is not an
autonomous one. And it fails to be autonomous no matter how elaborate
one’s freedom of choice is, or how developed her mental capacities for ra90
tional deliberation.
Moreover, these considerations suggest a possible hierarchy between
the freedom to choose or capacity for choice, and the actual exercise of that

conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be . . . a doer—deciding, not being decided for . . . .”).
87.
For a development of this view see, for example, Lee A. Bygrave & Jens Petter
Berg, Reflections on the Rationale for Data Protection Laws, in 25 YEARS ANNIVERSARY
ANTHOLOGY IN COMPUTERS AND LAW 3, 32 (Jon Bing & Olav Torvund eds., 1995) (“[T]he
interest in non-automated decision making . . . embodies a concern for personal integrity, and
ultimately a concern for human dignity.”); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF AUTONOMY (Sydney Shoemaker ed., 1988); Robert Young, The Value of Autonomy, 32
PHIL. Q. 35, 43 (1982). See also Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in
Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1062 (2015).
88.
This distinction has been made famous by JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 372-73 (1986).
89.
For the distinction between negative and positive freedom, see BERLIN, supra note
72, 118-72.
90.
Cf. RAZ, supra note 88, at 204.
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freedom or capacity of choice. Arguably, it is the exercise of choice that ultimately matters. The point of providing free choice and nourishing capacities is, at least in part, in the hope that these capacities will be put to good
use. As Joseph Raz notes, it is “the value of the exercise which endows the
91
capacity with what it is worth.” This self-authorship is the concept of autonomy which underlies political liberal theory: the individual is required to
engage in the act of choice, regardless of whether it leads to objectively optimal choices for him.
Obviously, choices are never completely unlimited: options are often
affected by natural limitations, as well as the actions and choices of others,
be it the state or other individuals. Choices are also pervasively shaped by
the surrounding environment including technological artifacts, which shape
the relationship between humans and their world and the way they perceive
92
and understand themselves. From the liberal viewpoint, this, by itself, is
93
not problematic, so long as choices are not artificially limited.

B. How the Rationales Are Affected by Algorithmic Assistants
Let us now explore how these rationales are affected by choices made
through algorithms. To make our case as strong as possible, we focus on an
algorithm which endeavors to serve only the user’s welfare, and which
makes an autonomous decision once the user chooses to employ it. In doing
so, we attempt to unravel the “choice paradox” identified above.

1. Efficiency Rationales
In those instances in which the algorithm reaches the same decision as
the user, but simply in a more efficient way, the efficiency rationale for human choice does not stand.
The more interesting cases are those in which the algorithm significantly alters the user’s choice. To determine the applicability of the efficiency
rationale in these cases, one must explore the reasons for such altered choices.
As elaborated above, altered choices often reflect the comparative advantages of algorithms relative to users, either because the use of algorithmic assistants leads suppliers to create better choices for consumers, or be94
cause it allows for a more efficient choice among the available options.
Research on consumer choice has also shown that while people tend to base

Id. at 372.
See John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. For
an overview of internal and external limitations on autonomy, see Benkler, supra note 18, at
35-37.
93.
See RAZ, supra note 88.
94.
See supra Section II.
91.
92.
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their significant decisions on rational considerations, smaller decisions are
95
often made impulsively and are not economically rational. This, in turn,
might lead to a stronger justification for using algorithms for small choices.
The algorithm can also bring about strength in numbers. First, the algorithm could create buyer power, either through the creation of a strong buying platform operated by one algorithm, or through coordination among
96
several algorithmic consumers. Generally, the stronger the buyer power,
the greater the benefits from the transaction that can potentially be passed
on to the user. Strong algorithmic consumers might also (partly) counter the
market power of suppliers. This is especially true with regard to small consumers, who could not otherwise easily protect themselves against such
97
market power. Second, the algorithm could create positive network effects.
For example, where a similar decision by all users implies that their welfare
would be reduced (e.g., everyone using the same road at times of heavy traffic), the algorithm might suggest an outcome that is best for all by directing
some drivers to alternative roads. Third, the aggregation of users under an
algorithm could reduce the ability of suppliers to discriminate among us98
ers. This is because once users are aggregated into sufficiently large
groups, suppliers lose the ability to collect information on users’ individual
preferences with regard to the products bought through the group, and to
discriminate among them based on each user’s elasticity of demand. This, in
99
turn, might increase at least some users’ welfare. Finally, the algorithm
could be designed to overcome collective action or negative externality
problems (e.g., by giving more weight in the decision process to considerations such as buying from firms using green energy). It could also increase
competition by taking into account long-term competition considerations,
for instance by buying some portion of a certain good from new entrants in
order to ensure they can grow in the market, thereby increasing overall effi100
ciency in the long-run.
Overall, where the choices made by the algorithm reflect its comparative advantages over users’ choices, the efficiency rationale for human
choice does not hold. Put bluntly, human choice is not a necessary constituent of efficient decisions.

95.
See Klaus Wertenbroch, Self-Rationing: Self-Control in Consumer Choice,
(INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2001/63/MKT, 2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=296954.
96.
Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 23.
97.
See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1324-25 (2015). Yet buyer power can sometimes have negative
effects on welfare. See, e.g., Gal and Elkin-Koren, supra note 9.
98.
See, e.g., Samuel B. Hwang & Sungho Kim, Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for ECommerce, in ADVANCES IN SYSTEMS, COMPUTING SCIENCES AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
149 (Tarek Sobh & Khaled Elleithy eds., 2006).
99.
Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 23.
100.
Id. at 22.
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Yet, as elaborated above, even an algorithm which strives to serve only
the user’s preferences might not always accurately reflect such prefer101
ences. Microsoft’s experience with its ChatBot provides an intriguing example. In 2016 Microsoft released a ChatBot called Tay.ai, designed to interact, inter alia, with Twitter users and send tweets based on such
interactions. A day afterwards Microsoft had to deactivate the account, due
to a large amount of offensive commentary by the ChatBot, which simply
mimicked other tweets, and which clashed with Microsoft’s preferences re102
garding the content of its ChatBot’s tweets. This example illustrates some
of the problems involved in basing one’s preferences on following the conduct of others. In addition, the fact that an algorithm makes the user’s decisions—even if he chose to employ it—might reduce the user’s sense of responsibility to such choices, therefore creating some negative externalities.
This detachment might be strengthened if the decision to employ an algorithm is itself made by another algorithm.
Users are thus vulnerable to algorithms’ limitations. Given these limita103
tions, does the efficiency rationale lead to human choice? The answer may
still be negative, depending on the circumstances. As noted above, in order
to be efficient, the decision of the algorithm need not be optimal, only better
104
than the decision the user would have reached without the algorithm,
when taking into account all the factors involved (including the time saved).
The answer also depends on whether users can differentiate between those
instances in which algorithms are beneficial and those in which they are not.
Yet even if users cannot differentiate between these cases, should they be
aware of the algorithm’s limitations they can choose not to employ algorithms—or at least not to do so without some overriding mechanism which
enables them to exercise their own discretion—in those decisions where the
risk to them of an inaccurate choice is high (e.g., choosing a business partner). The market could also provide a partial solution in the form of internal
indicators of accuracy (such as what is the expected rate of uncertainty) or
algorithms that compare the accuracy of algorithms.
Let us now briefly relate to a world in which algorithmic assistants are
not benign. Here, of course, the efficiency rationale for human choice might
be much stronger, given that the algorithm’s decision would not strive to

101.
Id. at 15.
102.
Sarah Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay, After Twitter Users Teach It
Racism, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoftsilences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-racism/.
103.
A simplistic argument provides that the mere fact that users continue to use such
algorithms is an indication of their positive welfare effects. While this is true to some degree,
it does not take into account factors such as information problems and nudging effects that
may explain such use.
104.
Users might define a better choice in different ways. For a partial discussion see
supra Section II.C.
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serve only the interests of the user. The ability to prevent such algorithmic
decisions depends, inter alia, on the user’s ability to realize, in real time,
that the algorithm does not serve (only) his interests. The black-box qualities of some algorithms—and especially those based on machine learning—
increases information asymmetries and reduces the ability of the user to
separate those actions which serve his interests from those which do not.
Yet even in such cases the overall effect on efficiency is not straightforward. For example, the efficiency rationale for human choice would not
hold in cases where the algorithm’s functions cannot be separated, and
where most of its decisions, including those that carry the most value to the
user, are substantially more efficient than they otherwise would be.
To verify the overall efficiency of employing autonomous algorithmic
assistants, it is also important to analyze the externalities they create on other markets and decisions. If, for example, the algorithm increases the market
power of existing digital platforms, which, in turn, block new innovation,
105
then these considerations should not be disregarded.
In addition, and more importantly, there is a certain worry that our capacity for decision-making could suffer. By willingly allowing ourselves to
be continuously subjected to algorithmic decisions in return for the highly
tailored convenience and efficiency which they appear to offer, we may be
slowly but surely eroding our capacity for internal processes of selfdeliberation, as well as self-creation and development, that enable us to
106
form preferences. This argument likens our decision-making capacity to a
muscle that needs to be exercised, in order to stay in shape. Furthermore, the
increased usage of algorithms by others limits one’s ability to deliberate and
learn from others’ experience with regard to the parameters that determine
their choices. Finally, the user’s ability to learn from mistakes may suffer if
the user is not aware of all the parameters that led to the algorithm’s
choice—especially when the algorithm is a black-box—and especially if he
is not aware of those options that were not chosen and how they compare to
those that were. Should these effects impair the ability of users to make efficient decisions in other spheres of their lives, then this negative externality
should also be taken into account in considering the effects of using algorithmic assistants on reaching efficient decisions.
At the same time, algorithmic assistants can create positive externalities
on other decisions. Research has shown that decisions deplete individuals’
107
internal resources of will-power and decision-making. Accordingly, once
we defer some decisions to algorithms, we can make better decisions in oth105.
For similar considerations see, for example, EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9 at
29-31.
106.
See generally, JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (supporting the claim that people need to develop their autonomy in a process of self-formation).
107.
See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING
THE GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 90-93 (2011).
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er spheres. This is because the algorithm’s will-power is not finite and it
will make the same decision late at night, after a day full of decisionmaking, that it would have made early in the morning. Overall efficiency
may thus arise if one chooses correctly which decisions are better deferred
to algorithms. In addition, by saving time on some decisions, one can spend
more time making other decisions. Finally, by observing the choices that
algorithms make—even if the user does not understand all the factors that
came into play—the user can indirectly learn to make better choices in other
spheres.
So far we have focused on the individual’s efficiency. Total efficiency
considerations add another important dimension to the analysis. Most decisions made by algorithms—especially those regarding regular consumption
goods or services—may generally increase total efficiency. Some exceptions exist. To illustrate, should deference to algorithmic decision-makers
indeed erode people’s capacity for processes of self-deliberation, our political institutions might suffer if citizens are less able to make sound decisions
108
in exercising their democratic rights. This negative effect can be compounded by digital “echo chambers” strengthened by the use of algorithms,
in which the information one receives simply echoes one’s views, thereby
indirectly limiting his ability to change his mind. While individuals may
prefer such echo chambers, and regard them as subjectively efficient, their
overall societal effect on democracy might be negative. Also, the use of algorithms may sometimes increase discrepancies in society, if they benefit
some groups at the expense of others. This may happen, for example, where
algorithms are not benign.

2. Psychological Rationales
The psychological effects of algorithmic assistants are ambiguous. On
the one hand, freeing users from the need to engage in some otherwise burdensome decisions may increase their well-being. As Barry Schwartz argues, the multiple choice economy we live in today might paradoxically re109
duce happiness. Indeed, at least in some spheres users may have a
preference that decisions be made by others. The fact that interactive movies, in which the viewers choose the endings have not succeeded as well as
their creators have hoped, might serve as an indirect indication of this tendency.
A related argument is that more free time may increase innovation and
creativity. Apple Inc.’s founder, Steve Jobs, provides an interesting exam-

108.
See Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poulett, The Right to Informational SelfDetermination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for
Democracy, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 45, 46 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
109.
Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2007), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VO6XEQIsCoM.
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ple: he wore the exact same clothes every day. This enabled him to limit the
choices he had to make on what he considered to be mundane issues, and
110
keep his energies for more creative ones. It is noteworthy that the importance of the connection between the use of algorithms and creativity extends beyond its direct psychological effects on the user. This is because we
may define ourselves not only through our autonomous choice, but also
111
through other means such as our creativity.
Choices made by the algorithm, which reflect the user’s preferences,
can also contribute to the user’s happiness. As Richard Ford puts it, “if we
have given up autonomy, it was only the autonomy to make poor choices,
go to bad restaurants with people we turn out not to like much, buy boring
novels, listen to ear splitting music, engage in activities where costs outweigh benefits. I am actually more free now than ever before because my
true self—the self that labored under misconceptions, limited information
and emotional noise—is now facilitated by powerful and benevolent tech112
nology.” Moreover, some psychologists argue that people’s ability to predict the effects of future events on their happiness is remarkably inaccu113
rate. Algorithmic assistants have the potential to reduce this problem.
On the other hand, it is not obvious that users would necessarily be
happier—or have a stronger sense of self-fulfillment—in a world in which
most everyday decisions were performed by algorithms. First and perhaps
foremost, employment of the algorithm could reduce people’s ability to define themselves through their choices. The user’s identity will instead be
shaped by the choices made through the algorithm, producing beliefs, goals,
perceptions, and interactions other than those which would have been created by the individual making choices in an unmediated way. If an algorithm
chooses the clothes I wear, the food I eat, and the books I read, on what basis do I fashion my identity? As Ford notes: “Over time, one could say that
rather than the computer profile reflecting my tastes, I reflect its tastes. Of
course, the profile started out trying to be as much like me as it could. So in
one sense, the computer has simply helped me to be a better me—one that
develops with the benefit of more information and more sound reasoning
114
than I would have had on my own.” Also, if choices shape one’s identity,
the algorithmic tendency towards path dependency on the user’s past choic-

110.
See WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 362 (2011). For the reduction of choice of
clothing as a method to reduce decision fatigue, see John Haltiwanger, The Science of Simplicity: Why Successful People Wear The Same Thing Every Day, ELITE DAILY (Nov. 14, 2014)
https://www.elitedaily.com/money/science-simplicity-successful-people-wear-thing-everyday/849141.
111.
This idea is reflected in the concept of homo faber—man as creator.
112.
Ford, supra note 44, at 1578-79.
113.
See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 24-25 (2006).
114.
Ford, supra note 44, at 1577.
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es can inhibit unconscious changes to the user’s identity that would have
otherwise occurred.
These effects can also completely change our existing social perceptions and interactions: What kind of signals could one use to enable others
to know who he really is? If others know that some of my choices were
made by algorithms, but do not know which ones—partly because such
transparency would be hard to implement—how would they react to my
choices? Alternatively, choices that do not mimic the user’s preferences can
affect the social reaction to him, in a way which is detached from his real
identity. Also, if users do not know or understand the parameters underlying
decisions made on their behalf, feelings such as fear of missing out and of
not controlling one’s life might increase.
Another point to consider is what consumers would do with the time
freed up by algorithms. Would the result actually be increased innovation
and creativity, or would it be laziness and complacency—and if so, what
would be the consequences of such a change for the individual and for soci115
ety? Also, how would people be affected by loss of the social interactions
that are often a by-product of shopping? Furthermore, psychological experiments have shown that many of our choices are based on opinions and in116
formation gathered from family, friends and acquaintances. Such sharing
of information serves a social function, beyond any efficiency considerations, which might be lost when algorithms make choices for us. In addition,
people may feel less self-fulfilled if they do not “own” their choices. Put
differently, the joy that comes from knowing you studied the options and
made the right choice, or that you learned from mistakes, will decrease once
decisions are made by algorithms. Finally, research has shown that some
117
people enjoy the act of choosing, even when the choice is not easy.
The matters raised here are beyond our expertise, but our intuition suggests that the effects of autonomous algorithmic assistants on users’ wellbeing may not all be positive, even if our lives are more efficient and the
118
“correct” decisions are made. The balance between the above considerations may differ based on the type of choice to be made, the overall number
of choices delegated to algorithms and their importance to the user, the ability of others to differentiate between choices made by the user and those
made for him by an algorithm, and the user’s personal characteristics. Ac-

115.
Ryan & Deci, supra note 83, at 1564 (noting that undermining autonomy and
choice might injure performance and creativity especially when it requires flexible, heuristic,
creative or complex capacities).
116.
See, e.g., STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSES (Martin Irle & Lawrence B. Katz eds., 1982); ROBERT E WITT, GROUP
INFLUENCE ON CONSUMER BRAND CHOICE 53 (1970) (demonstrating strong correlation between knowledge of peer choce and individual choice).
117.
Ryan & Deci, supra note 83, at 1576
118.
This is a complicated issue. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 109.
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cordingly, while the psychological rationales for delegating some decisions
to algorithms are strong, this unquestionably does not hold true for all decisions and all users.

3. Liberal Theory Rationales
As elaborated above, liberal political theory emphasizes the autonomy
of the self: that is, not only the capacity and freedom to reach one’s own decisions, but the supreme importance of actually doing so. Such autonomy
should be based on a freedom of choice. The use of algorithmic assistants
may affect freedom and autonomy in different ways.
Consider freedom first. Positive freedom requires that people be able to
act on their authentic will. It can be argued that deferring to algorithms is
generally compatible with positive freedom. The voluntary and informed
decision to implement the algorithm is, in itself, an act of choice. As Richard Ford puts it: “Remember, it’s all voluntary, I don’t have to accept any of
the suggestions offered by my cyber doppelganger. If the suggestions aren’t
good for me, I can reject them; if I really don’t like the idea of taking direc119
tion from a computer on general principle, I can resist.” According to this
view, it is limitations on our ability to use algorithms—rather than our voluntary and willful use of them—which harms positive freedom.
Furthermore, algorithms supply technological tools for making choices
based on one’s digital shadow. In other words, the algorithm is designed to
mimic users’ true preferences, thereby enabling users to more optimally fulfill their preferences. Under this view, the algorithmic assistant is simply the
efficient, long arm of its user. Furthermore, if, as Isaiah Berlin suggests, a
person’s positive freedom consists in liberation from occasional passions,
information limitations and biases, and if a free choice is one that conforms
to one’s higher, more rational self—to what one would choose in one of her
120
better moments, as it were —then freedom may in fact be better served by
algorithms. Paradoxically, our digital assistants might be able make decisions that are truer to our authentic selves—truer even than the decisions we
would in fact make on our own. Therefore, one’s self does not disappear,
but rather is embodied in the algorithm.
Algorithmic assistants raise an interesting question in this regard: to exercise positive freedom, must the user be aware of his self-inflicted limitations on choice, in particular the technological limitations of the algorithm
and the parameters used by it to make the choice? Put differently, can a rational or authentic choice be made if one is not aware of the factors that play
into the decision made on his behalf? This issue is, of course, most relevant
to “black box” algorithms. A potential response is that it is sufficient that

119.
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the user recognizes and accepts his unawareness, so long as he believes that
the algorithm is indeed attempting to further his own preferences. As noted
above, the market also has an important role to play here, in creating some
sort of signaling system to guide users to their best choices. Greater transparency can also reduce this problem, although, as Barocas and Nissenbaum
suggest, a “transparency paradox” may arise: providing the level of detail
needed to enable users to provide genuinely informed consent would overwhelm even savvy users because the decisional parameters are volatile and
121
indeterminate.
The effect of algorithmic assistants on positive freedom is, therefore,
dependent on their ability to reflect the user’s true choices as well as on the
awareness if the user of the parameters used to make the choice. Let us remember that true choices are not necessarily the optimal choices that one
could make, but those that best reflect the user’s preferences at the time of
the decision, which may include the pursuit of immediate pleasures, desires
and passions. In decisions which fall into the latter category, in which the
user actually wishes to be true to himself even if the decision is not an ideal
one, positive freedom will be harmed to the extent that algorithms are not
able to reflect and realize such choices. There is also a certain worry that
our capacity for decision-making would suffer even without positive freedom being limited, due to a limited exercise of decision-making by the individual, as elaborated above.
On the concept of negative freedom, which requires that one be able to
act without external restraints or interference, algorithms once again create
mixed results. On the one hand, their technological capabilities allow us to
overcome external restraints, such as countering supplier power, limiting the
ability of suppliers to engage in price discrimination, and opposing suppliers’ manipulative selling techniques.
On the other hand, they could potentially threaten our ability and liberty
to choose. One potential argument relates to the technological limitations of
the algorithm, which are reflected in and restrain their choices. Yet in our
view this argument should generally be rejected as an indication of harm to
negative freedom, at least when the user is aware of the algorithm’s limitations and still voluntarily chooses to employ it.
A more convincing argument relates to situations in which algorithmic
assistants possess significant market power which, in turn, affects the con122
tent of their choices in a way which does not serve the user’s interests. To
illustrate, consider the following example, which relates to the dominance of
a handful of extraordinarily powerful transnational companies in a global

121.
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and
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44, 59 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
122.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
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networked market for digital services. The comparative advantages of algorithmic assistants are often tied to their ability to access and analyze data
relating to a user’s preferences, in order to better mimic his preferences. Accordingly, data-driven network effects have the potential to increase entry
barriers, strengthening platforms which have better access to vast amounts
of data and their algorithmic assistants, and weakening the ability of inde123
pendent algorithmic assistants to compete in the market. This process is
part of what Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” in which
power is identified with ownership of the means of behavioral modifica124
tion. Yet note that such abuses or manipulations are not unique to algo125
rithmic assistants and can be reduced by some regulatory tools.
Finally, negative freedom could be indirectly reduced when the choice
not to employ an algorithm might be costly in the marketplace. For example, some sellers might offer a discount for users of algorithmic consumers.
As algorithms become more efficient, some industries might indeed require
some reliance on their decision-making powers, thereby reducing the freedom of users to decide whether to employ them.
The greater, more immediate concern created by algorithmic assistants
to autonomy seems, however, to be the harm to the act of choosing itself.
The concern is that autonomy is realized through the act of making choices,
and if we delegate this responsibility to an algorithm we ipso facto relinquish that autonomy (though we retain our capacity for autonomy, which is
a different matter, as discussed above). While we may have many options
open to us, the choice among them is not made by the individual based on
self-reflection and self-deliberation that lead to the shaping and application
of his preferences, but rather through an algorithm which is assumed to be
able to mimic these preferences. Note that this concern of harm of autonomy pertains even to the most benign algorithm conceivable, one which
makes recommendations which exactly mirror the user’s preferences. Indeed, the concern might in fact be graver in that case, because of the great
temptation to rely on such algorithms. Algorithms offer a trade-off of sorts:
autonomy is a price paid—freely and willingly—for superior capacity for
want satisfaction and convenience.
It is important not to overstate the case. Autonomy is one value among
others. This means that deference to algorithms may sometimes be worth
the price we pay in personal autonomy. For example, if an algorithm could
improve our accuracy in diagnosing terminal disease and offering adequate
treatment, the importance of saving lives would surely be more pressing
than the medical staff’s interest in exercising their autonomous decision-
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124.
Zuboff, supra note 12, at 81.
125.
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126

making. Some scholars go further and do not treat such limitations as
harming autonomy. Joseph Raz, for example, argues that individual autonomy and authority do not come into conflict when the authority is used to
service the individual. This may happen when the authority can better perform tasks that the individual would have performed, or when it overcomes
127
collective action problems. Gerald Dworkin suggests that decisions to
limit choice in order to fulfill a greater goal do not necessarily make a person less autonomous. The examples he provides are voluntary army service
128
and monasticism.
Furthermore, while writing our own life story is of high value, do we
have to color between the lines, or can we simply draw the bold ones and
delegate some of our decision-making powers to others? It can thus be argued that the act of choice is at least partly exercised by such delegation, or
by the choice we make of which algorithm to employ, especially if the user
is aware of the parameters used by the algorithm to reach the decision. Furthermore, it can be argued that enabling the existence of a rich repertoire for
the act of choosing—including choosing yourself or choosing by employing
129
different algorithms—can sometimes induce more meaningful choice. Yet
130
to be autonomous one must identify with one’s choices, and own them.
The question thus arises whether we will feel committed to our choices once
they are made by algorithms.
This leads to another observation: there are spheres of life in which
choosing is more important than arriving at the optimal outcome. For example, it might be ill-advised to use an algorithm to choose one’s partner, no
matter how superior the algorithm’s “taste.” It is also more difficult to justify the use of an algorithm in deciding whether to use lethal force in war131
fare, or in political voting. Most cases would fall somewhere between
these extremes. Furthermore, autonomy is not a dichotomous concept, and
partial autonomy can also further the liberal theory rationale, at least to
some extent. The thing to bear in mind is that our reliance on algorithms for
decision-making, even when generally justified, has a cost. To the extent
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that our autonomous way of living is worth caring about, this is a cost to be
reckoned with.
To conclude, the use of algorithmic assistants can be at least partially
justified by the rationales that support autonomous human decision-making.
Algorithms can often reach more efficient choices; they can increase one’s
well-being, at least in some cases; and they do not necessarily clash with
liberal political theory rationales. Yet these rationales do not hold for all decisions. Rather, some decisions are best made by individuals. Such decisions may differ from one individual to another, depending inter alia, on
their effects on one’s well-being (e.g., for one person it might be a choice of
clothes and for another the book he reads), the accuracy of one’s digital
shadow, and the absolute number of other decisions made by algorithms.
They can also depend on the subject matter of the decision (buying tomatoes
is not the same as political voting). This implies that while algorithmic assistants may enjoy significant comparative advantages over autonomous
human choice in many decisions, advantages which would most likely grow
with the advent of improved methods to determine human preferences and
create digital shadows, autonomous-choice rationales may still justify autonomous decision-making in some instances. Most importantly, the use of
algorithmic assistants should not harm one of the basic conditions for autonomous decision-making, namely the ability of the individual to form
preferences on which he can base his decisions, at least in those spheres of
life in which he chooses not to employ an algorithm. The next chapter explores the legal implications of our findings.

IV: Legal Implications of Changes in Autonomous Choice
It is only a matter of time before algorithmic assistants become commonplace. Their advent raises a host of intriguing legal challenges. In this
part we seek to shed light on those of challenges that result from the effects
of algorithmic assistants on autonomous human choice. We first explore
whether the use of algorithmic assistants should be allowed in light of their
effects on human autonomous choice. We then explore whether our regulatory tools should be recalibrated or rewritten in order to deal effectively
with the new challenges to autonomous choice. Our goal is not to provide
definitive answers for the myriad issues that arise, but rather to identify and
map them. Observe that other regulatory challenges, relating to other aspects of the employment of algorithmic assistants, which are beyond the
scope of this article, may also arise.

A. Should the Use of Algorithmic Assistants be Allowed?
One question focuses on whether we should allow the market to take its
expected course, or whether some limitations should be placed on the use of
algorithmic assistants due to their effects on autonomous human choice. In
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light of the conclusions reached in Part III above, several observations are in
place. First, we counsel against blanket restrictions on the use of algorithmic
assistants. Not only do algorithmic assistants offer many benefits, but, as
shown above, at least with regard to a subset of decisions their use does not
significantly clash with justifications for autonomous human choice and it
sometimes even furthers them. Moreover, banning their use creates the
“choice paradox” identified above, as it limits users’ freedom to voluntarily
employ such algorithms in order to aid them in making choices. This is
strengthened by the fact that in many situations the correct balance between
the autonomy to choose to employ algorithms and the autonomy to make
one’s own choices is not clear, and interventionary regulation can limit the
benefits to be had. Finally, at least in some areas such a ban would be difficult to implement—both realistically and theoretically—if the use of algorithmic assistants was allowed elsewhere around the globe, creating comparative advantages for their users or enabling users to employ algorithms
located outside their jurisdiction.
At the same time, some steps should be taken to ensure that algorithmic
assistants’ potential negative effects on user’s choice are accounted for and
justified. One major tool involves the support of market conditions that increase the incentives and the ability of providers of algorithmic assistants to
132
increase user’s utility. Competition in the market for the supply of algorithmic assistants, as well as in the market for tools that compare the performance of algorithmic assistants, can potentially improve the quality of
algorithms, and strengthen the incentives of providers of algorithms to ensure that the limitations they impose on human choice are justified. Competition in the market for inputs necessary to create or to operate algorithmic
assistants can increase the ability of algorithmic assistants to operate efficiently.
Antitrust is an especially potent tool to advance such market conditions,
as it strives to ensure that competition in the market is not limited by artificial barriers. To illustrate, a merger among producers of algorithmic assistants should be prohibited if it would significantly limit competition among
algorithms, thereby indirectly limiting users’ choice, without creating offsetting benefits for users. Another example involves the vertical integration of
algorithmic assistants with suppliers of products necessary to create or to
133
operate efficient digital shadows, such as data. Control over sensors might
be especially important, as sensors supply data that enables their controllers
to observe users’ conscious and unconscious behavior in the real world. For
example, they might be able to monitor users’ eye movements, heart rate

132.
2.
133.
at 29.

See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 202; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at
See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 195-96; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9,
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and tone of voice when users are exposed to certain products or ads. To ensure that no artificial barriers are created for competition among algorithms,
regulators must recognize the unique characteristics of the relevant markets
in order to deal with them effectively.
An interesting question that arises is whether, in considering the merits
of a potential action by a designer or provider of an algorithmic assistant
(such as a merger, joint venture or agreement with another market player),
antitrust authorities should take into account the limitations that the algorithm places on users’ autonomous decision-making. We suggest that the
answer is negative. Antitrust authorities do not possess the necessary expertise and tools, nor the democratic mandate, to evaluate such effects and to
balance them with competing considerations. Observe that while antitrust
authorities have expertise in analyzing how market dynamics affect the
choices open to consumers, their analysis largely takes as given that more
choice implies increased consumer welfare. This does not imply, of course,
that other regulators, who might possess expertise in such matters, cannot or
should not take such factors into account. For example, education experts
might weigh in on whether and to what extent to allow the use of algorithmic assistants by school children.
Increased competition cannot ensure, however, that algorithmic assistants are only employed where their harms to autonomous choice are offset
by benefits to individual and social welfare. There are several reasons for
this. First, individual decisions to employ algorithms cannot always be assumed to further the user’s long-term welfare. As noted above, this may result from a combination of factors, including collective action problems,
bounded rationality, limited information regarding the long-term effects of
using algorithms, and prioritization of short-term benefits over future harms.
Moreover, and arguably more important for regulation, the employment of
algorithms cannot be assumed to always increase social welfare. This is because private decisions fail to take into account the externalities they impose
on others. Social interests are thus not adequately accounted for in a system
based solely on private decisions about whether and when to employ algorithms. This conclusion serves as a call for exploring the possibility to limit
the employment of algorithms in some cases.
Information about the effects of algorithms can play an important role
in self-regulation. Accordingly, it is suggested that the public be educated in
the benefits of autonomous choice at least with regard to some decisions, as
well as in the potential benefits and limitations of algorithmic assistants, in
order to create such digital literacy. Exercises that emphasize the differences
between the two modes of decision-making can be promoted, as should the
development of a competitive market for tools used for comparing algorithms and for comparing the decisions of algorithms with those of humans.
In addition, it is important to emphasize the importance of exercising one’s
decision-making power, at least in some spheres of one’s life, in order not to
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lose this ability. Such efforts would help ensure that users are informed of
the costs and benefits involved in the decision to employ algorithmic decision-makers in different spheres of their lives. It does not ensure, of course,
that users will make long-term efficient decisions. This may result, inter
alia, from the fact that the ability to make sound decisions is one of longterm experience, while most decisions to employ algorithms involve short
term benefits, and people tend to favor immediate benefits over future
134
costs. Interestingly, a technological solution can partially reduce this
problem: an algorithm will determine which decisions and how many are
best made by the user himself.
A difficult question arises whether, in light of the above, the use of algorithms should be prohibited—or at least limited—to certain classes of potential users. In particular, should children, who have not had much experience in exercising their “preference forming muscle,” be allowed to use
algorithmic assistants extensively. Children who are not exposed to a variety of options and are required to choose among them will have more limited
abilities to select the option that best fits their preferences in the future. As
Yochai Benkler observes, in such cases the children’s ability to exercise au135
tonomy in the long-term is harmed. This question has both normative and
practical aspects. At this point in time, we suggest that no such governmental restrictions be imposed, given that to our knowledge most algorithmic
assistants are currently generally not made for use by children. Nonetheless,
parents should be encouraged to limit the usage of algorithmic assistants by
children, at least in some spheres. Also, studies on the effects on children of
the use of algorithmic assistants should be performed, and parents should be
informed of their results.
In addition, regulatory limitations should be placed on the use of algorithmic assistants where significant negative externalities might otherwise
be created. This is strengthened by the fact that users are not always aware
of or can minimize the unanticipated negative results of their use of algorithms. One tool to further this goal is to require some level of transparency
from the algorithm’s provider with regard to the algorithm’s potential effects on the user as well as on third parties, at least with regard to some
types of algorithms. Observe that such transparency, which resembles cautionary information regarding the use of medicine, is different from the type

134.
See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI & JENS GROSSKLAGS, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND
PRACTICES 363, 372 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008).
135.
See Benkler, supra note 18, at 40 (using the example of Amish elders who remove
their children from public school exactly at the age when they believe that education would
most influence their children’s preference-formation process and make them more able and
likely to choose a life other than as members of their community). Note that our case is more
complicated, given the Choice Paradox.
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of transparency usually suggested for algorithms, which relates to their code
and data sources.
Furthermore, the use of algorithmic assistants should be limited in those
spheres in which it is clear that the harm to autonomous choice cannot be
justified by the benefits that algorithmic assistants bring about. This justification can be particularly strong where the use of an algorithmic assistant
imposes strong negative externalities on others and clashes with our social
136
contract. For example, in our view algorithms should not be allowed to
choose senate members in a democratic society. Interestingly, even Isaac
Asimov, in his known story “Franchise” about the all-knowing Multivac
computer, did not completely eliminate the need to involve citizens in elections (although the decision involved input from one representative individ137
ual who provided the final bit of needed data). We do not argue that algorithms can never make better political choices. Rather, our suggestion is
grounded in the externalities political appointment decisions impose on social welfare. Should citizens prefer that important decisions that affect them
as a collective be taken by humans, based on self-reflections on their convictions, then algorithmic decisions on such matters clash with those citizens’ preferences, thereby indirectly negatively affecting their wellbeing
and infringing the social contract on which a democratic society is based.
Note that this suggestion goes beyond each individual’s claim for his own
individual autonomy, and is based on a demand that others in society exercise their autonomous choice in a sub-set of decisions which impose externalities on others. Our argument does not prevent individuals from making
up their own mind by using algorithms.
Finally, we suggest that in order to respect the user’s decision-making
autonomy, algorithms should generally be mandated to include a “stop button” which enables users to override the algorithmic mechanism at any
138
stage in the decision-making process. At the very least, the providers of
algorithmic assistants should be required to make available a compatible
version of their algorithm which includes such a function. External regulation is needed because it cannot be guaranteed that market conditions will

136.
To illustrate, the use of algorithmic assistants by consumers to find the best deal
while harming suppliers they bought from in the past is legitimate. This is because part of our
conception of the market rules is economic Darwinism: that these suppliers should compete
more effectively and if not, exit the market. They have no established right that consumers
will continue to buy from them.
137.
Isaac Asimov, Franchise, IF: WORLDS OF SCIENCE FICTION, 5-6 (August 1955).
138.
This idea partly resembles requirements for human-in-the-loop of algorithms in
some areas like health informatics. While these requirements are usually included to protect
third parties from decisions in which the algorithm’s performance can benefit from knowledge
or understandings that human intervention adds, here we suggest their application in order to
protect the autonomous choices of users. Observe, however, that some decisions might take
the algorithm a fraction of a second. In such cases, the only option that might be viable to the
user is to overturn the decision.
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always lead to the development of stop buttons in all relevant markets, especially if the algorithm is combined with other functions that make its
overall use attractive, and the transaction benefits the algorithm’s provider.

B. Regulatory Challenges of Algorithmic Decision-Making
Assuming that the use of algorithmic assistants is permitted in most
spheres of our lives, the question arises whether our existing regulatory
tools are sufficient to deal effectively with this technological change. In particular, we ask whether the fact that the user is one-step removed from the
decision and thus does not make a direct autonomous choice, should affect
the interpretation and application of existing laws or lead to the creation of
new laws. This is the focus of the analysis below. In particular, we identify
three major cornerstones of the law that go to the heart of human autonomous choice—namely assent, intent, and the protection of conditions for
exercising one’s freedom of choice (negative freedom)—and inquire how
139
they should be applied when choices are made by algorithms. Reevaluating existing legal standards in light of automated decision-making is essential for social welfare, as otherwise we might discourage the adoption or
140
patterns of use of welfare and growth-enhancing technologies. Alternatively, it might create a problem of moral hazard which can lead to excessive and socially harmful risk-taking. The importance of setting efficient legal rules that accommodate decisions made by algorithms increases in step
with the delegation of more tasks to algorithms.

1. Assent
Assent is a major cornerstone of many laws. In contract law, for example, the conscious, objectively manifested agreement to contractual terms is
141
a critical element of a contract. This condition is necessary in order to ensure that the contract expresses the choices of its parties. Assent also plays a
critical role in other areas of law, including antitrust, constitutional rights,
142
tort (such as informed consent to medical procedures), and privacy. In the

139.
Of course, other questions may also arise. For example, if an algorithm creates a
new invention, who qualifies as the inventor under patent law? See Ryan Abbott, I Think
Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079,
1114-16 (2016).
140.
Regarding patterns of use consider the following: A business can create and operate
its own algorithm, or contract-out its design and operation. Even when the former option is
otherwise efficient, the latter might be adopted if it reduces the risk of legal liability for the
algorithm’s actions, and such risk is sufficiently high.
141.
See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 45-46 (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 319 (1986).
142.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1894 (2013) (writing about privacy).
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previous section we dealt with the question of whether agreement to use algorithms should be the sole factor which determines whether their use
should be permitted. This section focuses on whether and how the user’s assent to the algorithm’s decisions can be inferred.
How does the fact that a decision is reached by an algorithm affect the
meeting of minds? Arguably, the contract is the result of the user’s voluntary and deliberate decision to employ a certain algorithm and to allow it to
make decisions for him. Therefore, a straightforward answer is that once the
143
algorithm is set in motion by the user, it acts as the user’s long arm. Indeed, current contract law presumes that algorithms are mere tools which
144
execute the will of their users directly.
This assumption may be problematic with regard to some algorithms. In
particular, when using predicted choice and paternalistic algorithms, which
have the ability to learn, thereby divorcing critical aspects of decisionmaking in contractual agreements from conscious determination by any in145
dividual, the user may not be aware of all the possible choices that can be
made by the algorithm, let alone keep track of all the parameters that the al146
gorithm considers on his behalf. Indeed, this knowledge gap is a direct result of the algorithm’s comparative advantage: as elaborated above, the algorithm can quickly consider a breadth of data that no human could, and it
can sometimes predict the user’s future choices better than the user himself.
Furthermore, in some situations the user may not care about the actual
choice made by the algorithm, so long as it makes a choice. A recent and
provocative example involves the Random Darknet Shopper, a shopping bot
used in an art project displayed at a gallery in St. Gallen, Switzerland, in
2015. For the duration of the exhibition, the artists sent the bot to shop on
the dark web, with a weekly budget of $100 in bitcoins. The bot chose items
and sent them to the artists by mail, without the artists knowing in advance
147
what would be purchased. The orders were then displayed in the gallery.
The problem, as Lauren Scholz argues, is that such algorithms stretch to
its breaking point the requirement of assent, far beyond the intents and ca148
pacities of the algorithms’ authorizing entities. The manifested intent to

143.
See Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 165
(2017). See also Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick but Still no Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS
169, 178-80 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2011).
144.
Scholz, supra note 142 at 132.
145.
Id.
146.
See generally, id.
147.
Items purchased by the bot included 10 ecstasy pills, a baseball cap-mounted hidden camera system, and a fake Louis Vuitton handbag. The exhibits were seized by authorities
after the exhibition closed. Mike Power, What Happens When a Software Bot Goes on a
Darknet Shopping Spree?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/dec/05/software-bot-darknet-shopping-spree-random-shopper.
148.
See Scholz, supra note 142, at 132-33.
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use an algorithm to set contractual terms is not the same as objectively,
manifestly assenting to the actual contract the algorithm reaches. If the instructions given to an algorithm are vague (such as find me the best deal),
the instructions cannot be said to reflect the level of objectively manifested
assent necessary to ground a contractual promise. The user assent to be
bound was not made at a sufficient level of specificity which is necessary to
149
form an enforceable contract.
To solve this problem, Scholz suggests that algorithms be regarded as
150
constructive agents for the purpose of contract formation. Agency law allows one to impute knowledge and intent to principals who are not directly
involved in tasks, including forming contracts. Principals can authorize their
agents formally, by implication, or by ratification, i.e., accepting the benefits of the acts of the agent. In agency law, the principal is usually liable for
the mistakes the agent makes; this is because the principal assumed such a
risk by opting to use an agent in the first place. Observe, however, that even
under agency law the principal cannot be assumed to agree to any action
taken by the agent, and much depends on the level of knowledge required.
Also, as Karanasiou and Pinotsis argue, the fact that the algorithm can take
informed decisions with no user’s involvement in the decision-making process or even in the goal-setting process, challenges the assumptions on
which the current concept of agency is based, which relate causality and in151
tent. We might thus need to reevaluate existing doctrines of agency law,
including the assumptions on which they are based, in light of technological
challenges, and verify that they serve us well in their current form.

2. Intent
The fact that the algorithm engages in autonomous decision-making,
which is one-step removed from the user but initiated by him, also raises issues regarding the user’s mental state, ranging from recklessness, through
negligence and intent, to specific intent. One’s mental state is central to
many areas of law, including criminal law and tort law. The question is
therefore whether and when a user, who employs an algorithm that creates
152
harm to another or to society, is legally responsible for that harm. Two
sets of interconnected issues arise. The first takes existing requirements for
liability as a given and explores when a user can be found to meet these requirements. The second explores whether new legal tools are needed in or-

149.
Id. at 155.
150.
Id. at 132.
151.
Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 180.
152.
Of course others may be responsible as well, including the algorithm’s designer or
supplier. These question are not relevant to this article.
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der to effectively deal with the new realities created by algorithms. We
153
briefly consider both, focusing on tort law.
Let us first differentiate between two extreme cases: one in which the
user could and should have known about the significant risk to others or to
society involved in the use of the algorithm, and another in which the user
was not and could not have been reasonably aware of such risk. Both are
clear-cut cases: while the former generally fulfills the requirement for a
mental state, the latter does not. Yet most cases fall in-between these two
extremes.
The issue of a mental state is especially relevant in the case of machine
learning algorithms. Such algorithms are designed to achieve a given goal.
They can do so by independently determining the means to reach that goal,
through self-learning and the reactions to its actions. In such cases the decision is not the fruit of explicit human design but the outcome of evolution,
154
self-learning and independent machine execution. Proof of the required
mental state in such situation—unless strict liability is applied—is not sim155
ple. On the one hand, the user chose to use the algorithm, and could have
checked with the algorithm’s provider whether a harmful or an illegal result
might arise. On the other hand, once we demand that the user acquaints
himself with the algorithm’s potential risks and when they might occur,
some of the benefits of using algorithms (saving time and effort, etc.) might
be lost. Moreover, even if the user is aware of a potential risk created by the
algorithm, he might not be cognizant of other market conditions which create the actual harm. Such harm would depend on factors not necessarily un156
der the user’s control, and which could change over time. Furthermore,
the algorithm’s designers and providers might be in a better position to improve its quality and better assess its potential risks. Finally, where the algorithm generally improves the prevention of harm relative to human decision157
making, this fact should be given weight. We therefore suggest that the
user’s awareness of the potential harmful effect should not be simply inferred from his decision to use to algorithm, at least in the absence of gross
negligence, and that strict liability not be applied. Where the user is demonstrably aware of the potential for harm, the fact that a sophisticated system
containing an autonomous algorithm performed the actual harmful act

153.
Note that similar questions arise with regard to the proof of an agreement among
algorithms. See, e.g., Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 44.
154.
Id. at 22-25.
155.
See Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1034 (2016) (noting that the liability framework governing securities trading is unable
to effectively deter and compensate harms in algorithmic markets. The framework of (i) intent; (ii) negligence; and (iii) strict liability is ineffective in markets that rely on algorithms for
trading).
156.
Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 14-16.
157.
See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 16, at 18-19.
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158

should not prevent establishing a mental state. Furthermore, a rule should
be developed to determine the level of awareness we expect from the user.
Such a rule should balance considerations such as the effects of the expected
level of awareness on the technological design as well as the use of algorithms, and the expected harm to others.
Algorithms may also affect the level of duty of care. As Ryan Abbott
argues, the “reasonable person” might potentially be replaced with a “reasonable algorithm” standard, at least where the use of algorithms is relatively easy and commonplace, and where it creates a much lower level of risk
159
than comparable human decision-making. This implies that the standard
may be higher than before.
The second set of questions is wider, and explores whether current
rules, which were created for human interactions, should similarly apply to
the actions of algorithmic assistants. Suggestions have been made to recog160
nize some types of autonomous algorithms as legal persons, making sophisticated autonomous algorithms the subject of specific rights and obligations, including that of making good any damage they may cause. In our
view, this is a problematic notion that inappropriately limits the liability of
the designer, provider and user, and blurs the boundaries between algo161
rithms and men.
Others have suggested strict and vicarious liability for the algorithm’s
actions: If the algorithm’s designer did not sufficiently inform users of any
dangers associated with the use of the algorithm, or if the algorithm was defective, the responsibility will lie with the designer. Otherwise, responsibility will lie with the user. This, in essence, is strict liability for failure to su162
pervise by effective oversight. Along this line, the European Parliament
recently issued a draft proposal for dealing with autonomous robots which,
163
in essence, are sophisticated algorithms. It recognized that the ordinary

158.
Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence: When Computers Inhibit
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1798.
159.
Abbott, supra note 16, at 39-41.
160.
See generally Tom Allan & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (1996); SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY
FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 153 (2011); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids
Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405 (2011) (noting that
human artifacts should be afforded legal rights if they meet certain criteria). See also F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1863 (2014) (noting that no legal personhood suggested to artefacts).
161.
European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with recommendations
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 2016).
162.
This is the legal framework with regard to deficient products.
163.
The characteristics of a smart robot are as follows: acquires autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its environment (inter-connectivity) and trades and analyses data; is self-learning (optional criterion); has a physical support; adapts its behaviors and
actions to its environment. European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs, Civil Law Rules on
Robotics, at 6-7 (2016).
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rules on liability are insufficient because they “cover cases where the cause
of the act or omission can be traced back to a specific human agent such as
the manufacturer, the owner or the user, and where that agent could have
foreseen and avoided the harmful behavior. . .[I]n the scenario where a robot can take autonomous decisions, the traditional rules will not suffice to
activate liability, since they would not make it possible to identify the party
responsible for providing compensation and to require this party to make
164
good the damage it has caused.” It therefore suggested that a rule of strict
liability should be applied to damages caused by smart robots, requiring only proof of a causal link between the harmful behavior of the robot and the
damage suffered by the injured party. It also suggested the creation of an
165
obligatory insurance scheme for the harm caused by robots. Suggestion
for strict liability might limit the incentives of designers of algorithms to enable the user to reprogram them to better fit his own uses, thereby potentially limiting welfare and growth. We therefore suggest a more nuanced rule,
which applies strict liability only in rare cases in which the risk of harm is
high and should have been known.

3. Regulatory Tools that Promote Negative Freedom
The third issue relates to the effects of algorithmic assistants on laws
which are designed to promote autonomy through negative freedom. Consumer law provides a useful example since its goal is to ensure that the consumer is not restricted or misled in his decisional parameters.
Algorithmic assistants affect the application of consumer law in at least
two ways. The first focuses on their potential ability to better detect mis166
leading information or unfair contractual terms, given their capacity to
more efficiently analyze information than human consumers. Furthermore,
this ability might reduce suppliers’ incentives to engage in such conduct,
thereby creating a (partial) market solution to the problem. A dynamic interaction will most likely develop: suppliers will seek ways to evade algorithms’ methods of detecting misleading information, the algorithms will be
programmed to overcome these evasion mechanisms, and so forth.
The second way in which algorithmic assistants might affect the application of consumer law is through their potential buyer power as noted
above, which could, at least to some degree, counteract suppliers’ power,
and reduce the latter’s ability to create one-sided boilerplate contracts. Once

164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
See, e.g., Hans Micklitz et al., The Empire Strikes Back: Digital Control of Unfair
Terms of Online Services, 40 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 367 (2017); Marco Lippi et al., Automated
Detection of Unfair Clauses in Online Consumer Contracts, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 145, 146 (A. Wyner & G. Casini eds., 2017).
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again, algorithmic assistants create market solutions that reduce the need to
apply consumer law.
The above raises intriguing questions: should the enhanced ability of
algorithmic assistants to detect unfair contractual terms reduce the responsibility of suppliers found to demand such terms? Put differently: Should we
allow a supplier to rely on this enhanced ability of algorithms in order to
claim that no harm was expected? Can a supplier claim that the mere decision to include such contractual terms in such an environment should be
treated as an indication that he did not believe it to be unfair, given that using unfair contractual terms in such an environment would have been
against his interest? Similarly, with regard to countervailing buyer power,
does the fact that consumers may enjoy stronger buyer power through the
use of algorithmic assistants reduce the need to apply limitations on boilerplate contracts? Does it change suppliers’ level of responsibility?
These are difficult questions that go to the heart of the law’s goals,
which need to be answered in our new economy. Our basic intuition is not
to allow suppliers to take a cynical advantage of algorithmic assistants. At
the same time, technological developments may justifiably change regulatory priorities, especially in a world of scarce enforcement resources. One relevant factor that should be taken into account is the ability of suppliers to
differentiate between those consumers who have other options and enjoy
buyer power, and those who do not. In addition, new laws may need to be
created to mandate suppliers to provide information about their products
167
that can be easily readable by algorithms.
At the same time, we might need to create new laws designed to curb
abuses by consumers rather than by suppliers, a direct result of the increased
abilities and powers of consumers operating through algorithms. This
change of focus requires fresh thinking, outside the box, but can rely on
some of the conceptions for abuse that apply to suppliers. Another area
where fresh thinking is required is how to define manipulations and misleading information in a world in which algorithms analyze information and
make decisions. To give a simple example, if an algorithm purposefully
places much emphasis on the user’s past decisions or on the decisions of his
peers, thereby changing the user’s consumption habits, would this be con168
sidered unwarranted manipulation and if so, under what circumstances?
One conclusion from the discussion of the three legal challenges is that
the legal consequences of the use of algorithms depend on and are affected
by the level of autonomy employed by the algorithm in its decision-making
process. Accordingly, algorithms based on machine learning and thereby

167.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 17.
168.
Manipulation can be broadly defined as the interference with the way that the other
“reaches decisions, forms preferences, or adopts goals.” The legal issue is when such manipulation is or should be prohibited by law. See, Benkler, supra, note 18, at 38.
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not based directly on the user’s choices, while potentially increasing the
benefits to users, also create the strongest challenges to legal doctrines de169
signed to apply to human choice. Another conclusion is that the
knowledge and understanding of the user of the algorithm’s decisionmaking process, as well as his potential influence over it, affect the legal re170
sult.
One final observation regards freedom of speech. The First Amendment
protects the expressive freedom of individuals which serves their autonomy
171
as well as the democratic discourse. Expressive freedom, in turn, is based
on the exposure of individuals to information on which they can form their
ideas, and on their ability to express the ideas formed. As Yochai Benkler,
Owen Fiss and others have forcefully argued, limiting exposure through direct or indirect state-imposed limitations such as intellectual property rights
172
and information laws harms the right to exercise the freedom of speech.
Algorithmic assistants create an even greater conflict, given that the auton173
omy deficit is voluntary and self-imposed. Furthermore, as observed
above, they may create a conflict between short-term and long-term auton174
omy if they diminish a person’s ability to form preferences. Yet while algorithmic assistants may systematically reduce the ability of users to create
preferences on their own, they also increase the range of options available to
users, of both final options of action as well as how to exercise their autonomy. These issues deserve a study of their own.

V. Conclusion
Tomorrow’s cyberspace will include algorithmic assistants, which will
make decisions for their users, based on users’ digital profiles, selecting
products services, and actions for the real world. Some of these algorithms
already exist today, and others are fast-developing, as the intersection of information technology, big data, and cognitive science enables the creation
of more powerful, faster, and more intelligent algorithmic decision-makers.

169.
See Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 5.
170.
See also Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with
Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 77, 113-115 (2015).
171.
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (“Those who won our
independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”).
172.
Benkler, supra note 18, at 27. See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
354 (1999); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
USES OF STATE POWER 37-38 (1996); Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
173.
External forces can also lead to the use of algorithmic assistants. See, e.g., Gal &
Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 125-38.
174.
See discussion infra; Benkler, supra note 18, at 34-35.
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What is unique about autonomous algorithmic assistants is that they bypass the individual’s autonomous decision-making process. Autonomous
choice is a cornerstone of our social, economic, psychological and political
systems. Therefore, it is essential to explore whether the introduction of algorithmic assistants will serve social welfare despite their limitations of
human autonomous choice. Indeed, before submitting to the convenience
and efficiency that algorithmic assistants may offer, we must be attentive to
their effects on our choices, determining our decisions according to parameters that are sometimes outside our control and even understanding.
This was the main goal of this article. As shown, most of the rationales
that hold for human autonomous choice are not significantly harmed by the
employment of algorithms, at least in some sub-sets of decisions. At the
same time, while algorithmic assistants may enjoy significant comparative
advantages over autonomous human choice in many decisions, which grow
with the advent of new methods to determine human preferences, autonomous-choice rationales may still justify human decision-making in some instances. Defining such instances is timely and essential, as otherwise we
might miss the opportunity to ensure that the use of algorithmic assistants
indeed fits our needs, preferences, and values. Interestingly, as shown, while
some of the challenges to autonomous choice created by algorithmic consumers are inherent, others can be solved by the market or through technological means, possibly even through algorithms.
Our second goal was to identify and analyze some of the regulatory
challenges that arise from algorithmic decisions in a system designed to apply to human choices. We identified three main areas of law—consent, intent, and laws that protect freedom of choice—that need to be reconfigured
to deal effectively with this new technological challenge. The article argues
that new forms of regulation are necessary to meet some of the new technological challenges to autonomous choice. Finally, we identified some cases
in which the use of autonomous algorithmic assistants should not be allowed, in light of its relationship with autonomous choice. We hope that this
article will serve as a basis for further discussions on the policy choices we
make with regard to this new and fast emerging technology.

